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Abstract: Turkey’s experience with democracy, at least in its procedural terms, is one which 
has been discontinuous thanks to repeated military interruptions to civilian rule. Since 1946, 
Turkey has experienced coups on an almost periodic basis, in the name of protecting the 
Kemalist  foundations  of  the  regime  from counter-hegemonic  currents  however  defined. 
These recurrent takeovers by the armed forces created a vicious circle for the survival of 
democracy  in  the  country.  In  the  meantime,  various  contentious  players  became 
considerably influential  at  different points, despite pervasive repression.  By contrast,  the 
specific junctures of transition to and resumption(s) of democracy were largely monopolized 
by military-bureaucratic elites leaving little room for grassroots participation. Still, public 
demonstrations  for  democratization  were  not  totally  absent,  and  at  times  articulated  by 
various civil society and social movement actors. In the last decade, the military’s political  
tutelage seems to have weakened,  yet  this  did not  suffice to  save Turkey from being a 
democracy  ‘in  danger’,  as  the  authoritarian  face  of  the  state  took  a  new  form  under 
subsequent AKP governments. Today, the continuous battle of re-democratization and de-
democratization is perpetuated in Turkey’s contemporary politics and society, perhaps most 
notably in the realm of the Kurdish question, while democratic contributors ‘from below’ are 
trying to increase their salience in a patronizing state.  
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Introduction
This  report  focuses  on  the  periods  of  transition  to  and  the  resumption  of 
democracy in Turkey with a specific eye on the roles of civil society and social 
movements.  Throughout  the  paper,  I  share  the  observation  that  democratic 
transitions  in  Turkey  have  followed  “a  strong  centralist  state  and  an  elite 
tradition”, which is “dominated heavily by a bureaucratic structure and culture” 
(Sunar and Sayarı 1986, 166). In that sense, the driving force to re-democratize 
usually  came  ‘from within’ the  authoritarian  establishment,  to  recall  Alfred 
Stepan’s (1986) conceptualization. Coupled with the structural conditions, this 
has not left much room for grassroots participation or contentious mobilization 
during  specific  periods  of  transition.  It  by  no  means  suggests  that  public 
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resentment  to  authoritarian  rule  was  absent;  instead,  this  report  singles  out 
various  albeit  rare  articulations  of  dissent  during  different  moments  of 
democratization.
The transition  to  electoral  democracy  has  largely  been  carried  out  by 
military-bureaucratic elites in Turkey. Their decision to democratize was driven 
either  by  political  calculations  and  bargaining  amongst  themselves,  or 
influenced by the motivations and pressures of their western international allies. 
The limited nature of civil society contributions to these processes sprang from 
similar reasons, but were mainly due to the political contingencies of the day. 
During  the  transition  to  a  multiparty  regime  and  subsequently  electoral 
democracy,  associational  forms  of  civil  society  were  broadly  premature  and 
monitored  by  the  state,  and  independent  political  initiatives  had  hardly  any 
chance to survive. Resumptions of democracy after military takeovers, on the 
other hand, were preceded by sweeping political repression under the martial 
law  of  the  junta  regime.  Still,  some  articulations  of  social  dissent  or 
mobilization  did  exist,  if  not  always  undertaken  by  democratically-oriented 
actors.
In fact, social movements and protest gained tremendous weight at certain 
times in the Republic’s history. Yet it  would be ontologically problematic to 
consider them within the frame of transition. In general, I concur with the view 
that the history of democracy in Turkey, and arguably elsewhere, is a continuous 
battle  between  re-democratization  and  de-democratization.  Conceptualizing 
transition  so  as  to  cover  the  country’s  entire  democratic  history  in  this 
perspective  would  not  only  be  a  shocking  example  of  concept-stretching,  it 
would also unnecessarily compel the scholar to write a cursory and superficial 
narrative,  since  more  than  that  would  be  unmanageable  within  such  a 
framework.
Periodization of democratic transition
Turkey’s multiparty regime has existed for more than half a century. Yet her 
experience with democracy is one that has been discontinuous given the cyclical 
military interruptions of civilian politics. The interesting story behind this, as 
Salvador Giner has observed, is that the coup d’états “have not been directed 
against democracy itself […], but rather the resumption of democratic politics is 
nearly always explicitly contemplated by the military and, what is more, does 
eventually take place” (Giner 1986, 38). This statement may sound somewhat 
naïve,  yet a cursory glance at the coups affirms that the military were more 
concerned with eliminating regime ‘threats’ from the political sphere than with 
permanently blocking democratic practice. For them, in other words, democracy 
was acceptable to the extent that the Kemalist currents of the regime (unitary 
state,  hardcore secularism,  market  economy etc.)  were not  purged by power 
struggles  between  different  groups.  Indeed,  the  first  breakdown  of  the 
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multiparty regime on May 27 1960 was shortly followed by a new constitutional 
draft which then paved the way to the re-installment of electoral democracy in 
October 1961. Ten years later, the military’s involvement took place in the form 
of a memorandum on March 12 1971, but this time the parliamentary system 
and the political parties retained their functions. The coup of 12 September 1980 
was by far the most repressive and brutal in terms of its short-term as well as 
long-term  consequences.  Yet,  it  did  not  generate  a  consolidated  military 
dictatorship; instead the transition to procedural democracy came three years 
later. 
In Turkey, the first signs of democratic transition came around the mid 
1940s  when  the  top  cadres  of  the  regime  were  motivated  by  domestic  and 
international factors in favor of a multiparty system. The establishment of a 
main opposition party in 1946 and the first  general,  albeit  not free and fair, 
elections a few months later marked the first concrete kickoff, so to speak, for 
the transition. The period until 1950 can be characterized as an era of partial 
liberalization. Indeed, the 23-year old ruling party retained its position in office 
and thus did not slew its authoritarian skin altogether, all the while sending the 
message that they themselves were not strictly abiding by their own previous 
policies of the single-party setting1. In May 1950 the first free and fair elections 
took  place  and  resulted  in  the  first  transfer  of  power  in  government.  The 
transition was complete.
From then on, the functioning of Turkish democracy has been interrupted 
almost once per decade. Twice, in 1960 and 1980, the parliamentary regime was 
repealed.  In  the  other  two  cases,  in  1971  and  1997,  military  involvement 
undermined  democracy’s  survival  without  dissolving  its  main  representative 
institutions. What can be said about the periods following the re-installments of 
democracy  after  military  interventions?  Leaving  conceptual  debates  aside, 
Turkey has never appeared amongst the ‘consolidated’ types of democracy. The 
transition to, and the reinstitution of democracy more than once were generally 
followed by prolonged terms of (re-) democratization and de-democratization, 
never incontestably ending in consolidation.       
Arguably, this represents a challenge for my effort to classify the periods 
of a fragile yet persistent democracy with respect to the post-transition context. 
For one thing, inquiring into the entire historical span of nearly seventy years 
would miss the transition frame as the main focus of this report. Needless to say, 
it  would  also  generate  factual  problems.  Yet  totally  disregarding  returns  to 
democracy  after  military  interregnums  would  oversimplify  the  fluctuating 
trajectory  of  democracy  in  Turkey.  To  balance  these  two  points,  I  will 
concentrate mainly on the 1946-1950 period, but will also briefly mention re-
democratization after the 1960 and 1980 coups, together with the role of social 
1For example, they started relaxing their strongly statist mentality concerning the economy, and espoused a more  
flexible perspective on religious education.
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movements in calling for democratic deepening since the 1980s. 
Establishment of the multi-party regime 1946-1950
Social and political background   
With the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 single party rule with a 
westernist nation-building agenda was set up. For this purpose, the governing 
elites  led  by  Atatürk  and  organized  under  the  Republican  People’s  Party 
(hereafter  RPP) launched a  top-down modernist  project  to  transform society 
entirely. Public reactions against the project were not absent, especially when it 
came  to  issues  such  as  Turkification  policies  or  the  de-Islamicization  of 
everyday life in the name of  laïcité. However, there was no tolerance for any 
kind of opposition, and contentious attempts were repressed severely2. From the 
1930s onwards, in particular, the autocratic character of the regime sharpened, 
paving the way to an extensive process of societal engineering. 
Nevertheless, a combination of domestic and international factors began 
to challenge authoritarian stability towards the end of the 1930s. Turkey had 
managed  to  stay  out  of  World  War  II,  but  could  not  escape  its  devastating 
effects. The economy receded to the extent that the population was suffering 
from food and other basic material shortages3. Prices rose sharply, and limits 
were placed on the consumption of certain basic goods. By the same token, half 
of the state budget was allotted to military expenditure to face to the potential 
threats  of  the  war.  Pauperization  spread,  while  a  small  group  of  wartime 
profiteers  emerged  as  a  result  of  the  shrinking  supplies  in  the  markets 
(VanderLippe  2005).  Moreover,  the  government  undertook  extraordinary 
measures  such  as  the  National  Defense  Law  (Milli  Korunma  Kanunu)  and 
Wealth  Tax  (Varlık  Vergisi).  The  former  bestowed  the  state  with  utmost 
authority over economic affairs, including the decision for compulsory work for 
peasants around mining areas like Zonguldak. The latter imposed ultra-heavy 
taxes  on  affluent  classes’  incomes  collected  specifically  from  non-Muslim 
minorities,  e.g.  Greeks,  Armenians,  and  Jews  (Akar  2009;  Okutan  2009). 
Besides,  several  provinces  including Istanbul  were placed under  martial  law 
(Örfi İdare Kanunu, 1940) which remained in force for seven years until 1947. 
Coupled with the relative unpopularity of Kemalist reforms, the deterioration of 
living standards fed the feelings of resentment to the political administration. 
2Intolerance to social opposition was exemplified by measures such as the Law on the Maintenance of Order, or 
by military operations against Kurdish rebellions. 
3Once Germany cut off exports to Turkey, imports and exports fell sharply. “Before cutting off trade, Germany 
supplied 51 percent of Turkey’s imports and took 37 percent of its exports, but in 1940 and 1941, these figures  
dropped to 12 percent and 9 percent respectively. As trade with Germany fell, trade with Britain and the United 
States made up only part of the shortfalls in the early years of the war” (VanderLippe 2005, 66). 
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However,  tough  state  repression  hampered  the  flourishing  of  any  organized 
opposition, and public protest was confined to minor activities such as “to burn 
the ears off of İnönü’s portrait on Turkish money, to send the message that he 
was  not  listening  to  the  cries  of  the  people”  (Keyder  1987,  quoted  in 
VanderLippe 2005, 73).      
Political elites: the beginning, development, and completion of transition
Political  elites  in  Turkey with uncontested  access  to  power  originally  had a 
military-bureaucratic  identity.  Most  “consisted of  ‘civilianized’ military men, 
intellectuals, and professionals closely associated with the government” (Karpat 
1964,  51).  The  ensuing  composition  of  the  elites  also  reflected  a  peculiar 
occupational pattern in the parliament.
Prior to 1950, the largest single occupational group in the Parliament consisted 
of  civilian  government  officials,  who  accounted  for  20-25  percent  of  the 
membership. Military officials were the second largest group with 15-20 percent 
of the members, followed in turn by law (10-15 percent), commerce, trade, and 
banking (10-15 percent), and education (5-10 percent) (Tachau and Good 1973, 
554).
As mentioned, popular discontent with the worsening of social and economic 
conditions  could  not  easily  be  articulated  through  established  or  grassroots 
channels due to strict regime controls. Yet around the mid-1940s the political 
elites themselves became aware of a need for change within the regime. This 
recognition was motivated by both international and domestic concerns. At the 
international  level,  the  post-World  War  II  adjustment  of  Turkey’s  foreign 
relations created an impetus for loosening the premises of the single-party rule. 
For instance, the country’s participation in the San Francisco Conference and 
the  foundation  of  the  UN  in  1945,  and  increasing  American  and  British 
influence  over  its  internal  affairs  encouraged  Turkey  to  join  the  democratic 
alliance of  the West.  Indeed,  the Turkish delegate in San Francisco publicly 
announced that Turkey was ‘“determinedly progressing on the way to modern 
democracy’” (Karpat 1959, 141). The president and the ‘permanent’ head of the 
RPP, the so-called National Chief İsmet İnönü, also came to be a spokesman for 
a  prospective  democratic  transition  by  openly  advocating  the  idea  that 
democracy  was  a  requirement  for  development  into  an  advanced  nation 
(Koraltürk 2007, 79). 
By  the  same  token,  an  emerging  group  in  the  elite  of  the  RPP was 
uncomfortable  with  the  tight  measures  of  the  two-decade  old  one-party 
government. In June 1945, four of them, Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü, Celal 
Bayar, and Refik Koraltan signed a statement entitled the Proposal of the Four 
(Dörtlü Takrir). The statement underlined the importance of respect for human 
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rights  and  liberties,  and  recalled  the  liberal  spirit  of  the  1924  Constitution 
jettisoned by prolonged restrictions on the polity. The proposal was rejected for 
debate in the Assembly, three of the signatories were expelled from the party 
and one resigned (Koraltürk 2007). Later, the four agreed on the formation of a 
new party (January 1946) which they named the Democratic Party (hereafter 
DP),  inspired  by  the  U.S  model.  Ideologically,  the  DP  did  not  differ 
considerably from the RPP, except for its critique of etatism and heavy-handed 
state policies. The government ostensibly welcomed the DP’s establishment. In 
addition,  the  RPP held  a  convention  in  May  1946  which  ended  with  some 
promises  for  reforms  within  the  party  and  liberalization  within  the  regime. 
These included initial amendments to the Press Law, the Association Law, and 
the  University  Law.  Yet,  during  the  convention,  İnönü  also  announced  the 
rescheduling of the general elections in July 1946, earlier than the initial date 
(1947), leaving the opposition without sufficient time to organize and address 
the electorate. Thanks to the majoritarian system and electoral fraud (linked to 
open ballots and secret  counts),  the RPP did not  thus lose to the DP in the 
summer of  1946, and the latter  gained only a minor number of  seats in the 
parliament.           
Until the next elections in 1950, the democratic transition remained in an 
intermediary  phase.  The  Democrats  were  not  satisfied  with  the  liberalizing 
reforms of the Republicans, as they criticized, for example, continued martial 
law in several of the country’s provinces. Along these lines, the DP drafted what 
they called the Freedom Charter (Hürriyet Misakı) at their first party convention 
in January 1947. The Charter embraced a list of conditions for the survival of 
democracy, such as changes to the electoral law and the elimination of anti-
constitutional laws. The Republicans, on the other side, split between hardliners 
versus moderates. The latter proved dominant in the party, as became evident 
with  İnönü’s  July  12 Declaration (1947).  The Declaration  assured the  equal 
treatment  of  government  and  opposition  parties,  furthering  support  for  the 
multiparty  system.  This  compromising  attitude  was  consolidated  at  the  7 th 
Convention of the RPP a few months later, when the Republican’s conception of 
etatism was relaxed; issues such as teaching religion in schools were debated, 
and reforms in the party organization adopted. The abolition of martial law in 
Istanbul and her adjacent provinces after seven years was the next step in this 
relatively liberal turn (Karpat 1959). 
Although  the  liberal  moves  of  the  Republicans  generally  loosened 
tensions with the Democrats, a group within the DP felt particularly annoyed by 
these measures. In their opinion, the Republicans were simply trying to absorb 
opposition demands and subdue them according to İnönü’s wishes rather than 
follow genuinely  liberal  goals.  The dissidents  led  by  Fevzi  Çakmak,  Kenan 
Öner, and Hikmet Bayur split from the Democrats as a consequence and formed 
the Nation Party in July 1948 with the claim of “genuine opposition to the rule 
of RPP, fair and free elections, better relations with Muslim countries, and the 
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end of government interference in religious affairs”  (VanderLippe 2005, 175). 
In  the  meantime,  the  Republican  cabinet  presided  by  Hasan  Saka  was 
unsuccessful  in  its  attempts  to  tackle  the  chronic  problems of  the  economy 
manifest in rising unemployment and prices. He was replaced by the premier 
Günaltay, a liberal figure who “believed in free discussion, free press, and a 
safe, impartial election system” and “promised to take all measures necessary 
for a free election in 1950” (Karpat 1959, 229). 
Indeed,  the  elections  in  May  1950  took  place  freely  and  fairly.  The 
Democrats won a sweeping victory against the Republicans. They were further 
rewarded  by  majoritarian  rules  granting  them  around  400  seats  in  the 
Parliament. The first transfer of power in Turkey’s history thus occurred. The 
transition, therefore, was complete. 
Civil society
This section is about the essential  features of civil  society in Turkey during 
democratic transition. Let me reemphasize that the contribution of civil society 
to the introduction of democracy in Turkish political life was minimal. This was 
so because, as already indicated in the previous section, the transition process 
was largely driven by political elites who did not rely on societal input ‘from 
below’. 
Prior  to  the  democratic  transition,  political  opportunities  were  not  the 
most favorable for a vibrant civil  society to develop. Law no. 3512 of 1938 
(Cemiyetler Kanunu) regulated associational life in the country in a very strict 
manner. For instance, the formation of organizations based on locality, family, 
religion,  and  class  was  prohibited  (Turkish  Official  Gazette 3959,  1938). 
Previously, some of these forms of association were present, such as the Turkish 
Workers  Union  (Türkiye  Amele  Birliği)  and  it’s  successor  the  Workers 
Development Society (Amele Teali Cemiyeti) (Güngör 1996, 40; Anon. 1996a, 
69–71). Nevertheless, such experiments were outlawed or repressed under the 
Law  on  the  Maintenance  of  Order  (Takrir-i  Sükun)  in  1925,  enacted  as  a 
response to the persistent Islamist and Kurdish rebellions in the country. Hence, 
civil society activities, let alone political engagement, were extensively limited 
and strongly monitored by the state. 
Before  1946,  one  of  the  few  and  most  notable  platforms  where 
oppositional  views  could  be  voiced  was  newspapers.  One  of  these,  Vatan 
(Homeland), had been run by Ahmet Emin Yalman since 1940 (again after a 
first  experience  in  the  1920s)  and  published  articles  praising  the  virtues  of 
democracy.  Another,  Tan  (Dawn),  run  by  Zekeriya  Sertel  and  Sabiha  Sertel 
concentrated on economic problems with socialist  tendencies (Gürkan 1998). 
However, it was not an easy task to espouse an oppositional stance against the 
government,  the  costs  of  which  eventually  proved  highly  detrimental.  In 
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December 1945, a sizeable mob mostly composed of university students looted 
Tan’s central office along with those of some other leftist journals in Istanbul. 
Soon after, the newspaper terminated publication activities (Kabacalı 2007, 94–
99). 
With the beginning of the transition there was a slightly positive change 
in  opportunities  for  non-state  actors.  Arguably,  this  was  most  remarkably 
echoed in the growing number of political parties - the Democratic Party was 
not the first opposition party to be founded in the period. Before it, the National 
Resurgence  Party  created  by  Nuri  Demirağ,  a  prominent  businessman,  was 
established with a liberal stance in September 1945. Yet the party did not attract 
mass support and remained marginal in the subsequent elections. Besides these 
two  parties,  Cemil  Koçak  (2012)  notes  that  more  than  twenty  parties  were 
established between 1945 and 1950. Those ranged from the Turkish Socialist 
Workers Party to the Islamic Protection Party, with various political agendas. 
Nonetheless, “the institutional commitment of these opposition parties was to 
never become government and to never intend to do so!” (Koçak 2012, 195). 
Although  many  accentuated  issues  such  as  the  separation  of  powers, 
impartiality  of  elections,  or  constitutionality,  they  refrained  from  directly 
challenging the authority of Republican rule. As a consequence, their effect on 
governmental  decisions  proved very weak.  Eventually,  most  of  these parties 
survived for only a few years or less, and some were subsequently banned from 
political activity. 
The liberalization within the regime also had an effect on associational 
life. As mentioned in the previous section, a number of legal changes including 
the  Association  Law  allowed  organizations  based  on  class  interests  to  be 
formed. Plenty of labor unions emerged following this legal opening. Some had 
affiliations with the leftist parties, whereas many others were controlled by the 
RPP. Yet unions were deprived of the official right to strike. Plus, the common 
allergy against Soviet ideology and the general antipathy towards the left at the 
elite level placed formidable constraints on union activity (see next section).
All  in  all,  the  process  of  democratic  transition  helped organized  civil 
society blossom only to a certain extent. However, this awakening was small in 
scale, largely due to the limited nature of the liberalization brought about by the 
transition. 
The labor movement
Under  single-party  rule,  the  labor  movement  lacked  the  legal  channels  and 
resources to develop. Thus, the potential contribution of labor to the democratic 
transition  was minimal,  if  not  nonexistent.  In  reality,  the  early  years  of  the 
Republic  recorded  only  a  few  organized  labor  demonstrations  and  strikes 
(Keskinoğlu  1996,  493).  Yet  from  the  late  1920s  onwards  the  state  both 
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deepened its  authoritarian character  and controlled the entire economic field 
under etatism. This culminated in the relative prosperity of the working class, 
mostly employed in the public sector on the one hand; and on the other legally 
ruled out class-based organized activity. 
At the end of the 1930s not only did material conditions deteriorate but 
the economic share of private enterprises also began to grow due in particular to 
war-profiteering.  The  aforementioned  National  Defense  Law  (1940),  for 
instance, increased working days to eleven hours, enforced obligatory work, and 
introduced a ban on leaving the workplace (Güzel 1993, 166–173). Employees 
in private ventures suffered more on the grounds of the unrestricted application 
of working regulations. Under such circumstances, labor dissent was obviously 
mounting  yet  workers  could  not  engage  in  any  kind  of  mobilized  struggle 
largely because of the absence of any organizational infrastructure. The regime 
did  not  even  tolerate  weeklies  such  as  Sendika  (Syndicate),  an  issue-based 
newspaper expressing labor problems and demands. The newsparper managed 
just sixteen editions until its closure in December 1946 (Ibid. 294). 
In  May  1946,  the  government  officially  recognized  the  right  to  form 
class-based  organizations,  and  in  February  of  the  next  year  a  law on  labor 
unions  was  passed  (Güzel  2007,  111–112).  Yet  this  only  brought  partial 
liberalization for labor.  Indeed,  shortly after the government’s recognition of 
class-based organizations, two socialist parties, the Turkish Socialist Workers 
and Peasants Party (TSEKP) and the Turkish Socialist Party (TSP) were formed. 
These parties pioneered the establishment of leftist labor unions independent of 
the regime’s political center. The birth of what is called the “Syndicalism of 
1946” (Öztürk 1996; Toprak 1996; Çelik 2010) was initially ignored by the RPP 
rulers.  However,  the  burgeoning  trade  union  activism  soon  alarmed  the 
politicians  in  Ankara  who  were  suspicious  about  the  spread  of  communist 
ideology through these labor unions. As a result, the Martial Law Department in 
Istanbul  banned  both  the  two  socialist  parties  and  the  affiliated  unions  in 
December 1946, just six months after their establishment (Çelik 2010, 107). 
Eventually, the Republicans themselves participated in the formation of 
unions,  mostly  by  converting  previous  workers’  associations  into  state-
sponsored unions. For this purpose, the Istanbul branch of the RPP set up what 
they called the Worker’s Bureau (İşçi Bürosu) and which also covered other 
regions. They instated a regional federation of labor unions in Istanbul (İİSB) 
and  published  a  newspaper  called  Hürbilek  (Free  Brist)  to  indoctrinate  the 
Republican perspective within trade unionism (Doğan 2003). The right to strike 
was not  granted,  and even some of  the  state-sponsored unions  claimed that 
striking was a harmful practice and not beneficial for the workers (Koç 2010). 
Examples  of  wildcat  strikes  were  also  very  rare.  Interestingly  enough,  the 
Democrats  advocating  the  lawful  exercise  of  strikes  in  opposition  did  not 
legalize this once in power in 1950, nor throughout their entire decade in office. 
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In this climate, the labor movement entered a phase of ‘tutelage syndicalism’ as 
Çelik  (2010)  phrases  it,  which lasted roughly  until  the late  1960s when the 
political left gained some momentum in Turkey. 
Student mobilization
No sustained student movement was present throughout 1940s and until the end 
of  the  democratic  transition.  Yet  the  period did  witness  the  emergence  of  a 
number of student organizations, most of which were enabled by the 1938 law 
on  associations.  Until  then,  the  most  notable  student  organization  was  the 
Turkish National Student Union (hereafter MTTB) which had been active since 
1916. It was an admirer and a protagonist of Turkification and nation-building 
policies, at times mobilizing small rallies on the streets. Several years after  its 
closure, the Union was reactivated in 1946 along with newly emerging student 
associations (Okutan 2004). 
This period was marked by ultra-nationalist and pan-Turkist influences on 
student mobilization. Most probably inspired by the fascist ideologies of the era, 
these students adhered to expansionist  interpretations of nationalism.  Among 
others, the Turkish Culture House (Türk Kültür Ocağı), Turkish Association of 
Culture  Studies  (Türk  Kültür  Çalışmaları  Derneği),  and  Turkish  Youth 
Organization (Türk Gençlik Teşkilatı) were at the forefront of such initiatives. 
The Turkish National Student Federation (TMTF) followed a similar line, yet it 
was less concerned with direct political involvement than with the problems of 
students and universities (Szyliowicz 1970, 156). Some of these organizations 
acknowledged their “ideational struggle against attacks on the Turkish culture 
and  ideas  incompatible  with  nationalism”,  while  others  espoused  a  more 
militant path (Kabacalı 2007, 101). In general, they had adverse relations with 
leftist  ideas  and ideologies,  displayed through offensive  behavior  on  several 
occasions. The aforementioned looting of the Tan newspaper and other left-wing 
journals was but  one example of such behavior. In another case,  a group of 
students  from the  same circles  blocked  a  conference  speech  by  a  professor 
known as a leftist at the Ankara University campus in March 1947. The next 
day,  a  greater  number  of  students  marched to the  Ulus  square  in  the  urban 
center, burning oppositional newspapers and journals on the street. Similarly in 
December 1947, a large student protest denouncing communism was organized. 
In  the  course  of  the  event,  the  protest  turned  against  the  rector  of  Ankara 
University,  blamed  for  protecting  leftist  academics,  and  demanded  his 
resignation. The rector was only able to leave the campus in the company of 
military officers (Ibid., 105).
Besides  these  groups,  there  were  also  some organizations  sympathetic 
towards  leftist  ideologies.  Yet  the  prevalent  political  climate  was  extremely 
unfavorable  for  their  survival.  In  addition  to  the  popularity  of  the  ultra-
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nationalist  mindset,  the anti-leftist  consensus within the political  mainstream 
undermined  the  mobilization  of  the  leftist  youth.  A few  examples  of  such 
organizations were the Youth Association of Turkey (Türkiye Gençlik Derneği) 
and the High Educational Youth Association of Istanbul (İstanbul Yüksek Tahsil  
Gençlik Derneği). Some of their members were affiliated with the underground 
Turkish Communist Party (TKP). Attempts at collective action were confined to 
instances  such  as  petitioning  for  the  amnesty  of  Nazım Hikmet,  or  leaflets 
against university fees. 
Religious mobilization
As mentioned, the de-Islamization of public life in the name of a secular state 
was  not  wholeheartedly  embraced  by  the  public,  instead  triggering  some 
popular reaction. In the early years of the republican reforms, these reactions 
were embodied in the form of rebellions, if not sustained movements. The well-
known Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925 deserves separate attention since it merged 
Islamic  and  Kurdish  resentment  to  challenge  the  Republican  authority.  Yet 
religiously motivated upheavals were definitely not confined to this event. For 
instance, a Nakshibendi order in a northern province, Rize, “attempted an armed 
rebellion” the same year “in protest against the wearing of hats and the alleged 
decision of the government to outlaw the veil” (B. Toprak 1981, 69). On some 
notorious  occasions  rebels  went  so  far  as  to  behead  military  officers,  as 
happened for example in one small Aegean town near Izmir in 1930 (Ahmad 
1988,  754–755).  Outbursts  of  Islamic  insurgency  continued in  Bursa  (1933) 
against the practice of calling for prayer in Turkish; in Eruh (1935) where a 
sheikh, after claiming himself Mahdi, staged an armed struggle; and in Çorum 
the following year (Özek 1982). Alarmed by such threats to secularist reforms, 
the Turkish state did not refrain from taking repressive measures. Still, it was 
impossible  to  extinguish  Islamic  communities  or  brotherhoods  (tarikat) 
altogether, only to push them further underground.
Although  the  transition  to  the  multiparty  regime  engendered  relative 
tolerance in terms of religious affairs (Lewis 1952), Islamic opposition was still 
limited. This was mostly because of “the criminal charges and heavy sanctions 
against actions aiming at the restructuring of the state according to the Islamic 
principles” (Duman 1999, 33). Together with this, certain Islamic groups did not 
hesitate to show themselves in the public sphere with offensive behavior against 
the regime’s symbols. For instance the  Tijanis, stemming from Morocco and 
who conveyed their  doctrine to Turkey in the early 1930s,  began destroying 
statues of Atatürk for the first time in 1949 (Özek 1982, 552). In fact, it was 
largely due to their persistent attacks that the first DP government felt obliged to 
pass a law banning public insults against Atatürk and his memory in 1951. 
 Under  these  circumstances,  Islamic  opposition was mainly  channeled 
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through  printed  media.  Two  examples  are  worth  mentioning.  One  of  them, 
Sebilürreşad4, was a journal which has been banned before the multiparty era, 
but  was started up again in  the transition period in 1948. The authors were 
critical of both the Republicans and the Democrats since they did not much 
differ  in  their  political  attitudes  towards  religion.  They  were  in  addition 
disappointed with the latter as they did not fully meet the pious expectations of 
the Muslims. Addressing the DP deputy Celal Bayar, the publication stated that 
once: 
[…] The people embraced the Democratic Party expecting that the party would 
allow the development of religious freedom as the other liberties; would not 
show hatred but respect towards Shari’a. However, today we regret to see that 
their leader attempted to defy the Shari’a even before seizing power […] (Eşref 
Edip, quoted in Duman 1999, 36). 
The other example worthy of mention is  Büyük Doğu  (Great Orient), another 
journal first published in 1943. The journal’s opposition also revolved around 
Islamic decay under the RPP’s secularism. After the Democrats’ victory in 1950, 
both journals leaned towards the DP as the ‘lesser of two evils’. For them, the 
return  of  the  RPP to  power  “would  be  a  disaster,  the  Muslims  would  be 
slaughtered again” (quoted in Duman 1999, 50).
In a nutshell, Islamic opposition both under single party rule and during 
transition was limited and did not directly challenge the idea of autocratic rule 
but rather its secular agenda. Their relationship with democracy took the form 
of  positioning  themselves  vis-à-vis  competing  political  actors  once  the 
multiparty game was introduced. Yet at times this positioning entailed nothing 
but an outcry for Shari’a rather than a deliberate request for democracy. Thus, it 
is hard to acquiesce to a significant contribution from the Islamic opposition to 
democratic transition in this period. 
Protest events
During and  around the  transition  period big  protest  events  were  not  a  very 
frequent  phenomenon in Turkey,  but  there  were  some notable  exceptions  to 
document.  One was the large gatherings to celebrate the Democratic Party’s 
entrance  into  politics  as  an  alternative  to  single-party  rule.  The  contentious 
character  of  such meetings  derived from popular  resentment  of  the RPP.  At 
times, these gatherings took the form of a public rally to welcome a DP leader 
to a town; at others DP cadres themselves organized demonstrations to protest 
against the RPP’s political domination.
Soon  after  the  general  elections  in  July  1946,  the  Democrats  were 
4The name is composed of two separate words: Sebil means public fountain built to distribute drinkable water 
for piety, whereas Reşad means being or walking on the just path. 
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convinced that the Republicans had manipulated the elections, particularly in 
the DP’s strongholds. To protest the alleged electoral fraud the party organized a 
series  of  mass  meetings  in  several  towns.  On 25 July  1946,  thirty-thousand 
people thus assembled on the Cumhuriyet Square in Izmir following a call from 
the DP administration.  Several speakers from the local  branch addressed the 
crowd,  and  harshly  criticized  government  pressure  seeking  to  curb  the 
opposition’s  political  struggle  (Cumhuriyet 26.07.1946).  A  similar  event 
followed  two  days  later  in  Bursa,  where  the  number  of  participants  was  a 
reported  twenty  thousand  (Cumhuriyet 28.07.1946).  The  crowd  was  fifteen 
thousand strong in Balıkesir (July 29th); while in Konya (July 31st) the majority 
of  the  attendees  were  artisans  and  shopkeepers,  and  the  meeting  dispersed 
without public order incidents after speeches by local party elites (Cumhuriyet 
02.08.1946).  The  next  day,  the  Democrats  held  another  protest  meeting  in 
Ankara with the participation of  forty thousand people.  Despite  it  being the 
hottest day of the season, the newspaper noted, popular interest in the meeting 
was considerably high (Cumhuriyet 04.08.1946). Actually, this level of public 
enthusiasm was heralded by the arrival of Marshall Fevzi Çakmak a few days 
before the visit of the party leaders in the capital. He was one of the leading 
figures of the Independence War and a committed conservative who also ran as 
a candidate for the DP. A crowd of thousands gathered in front of the central 
station. Cumhuriyet also reported that two buses of policemen were brought in 
advance, but were unable to calm the excitement of the crowd. 
For a couple of days, people went to the station with the expectation that the 
Marshall would arrive. Once the news of his arrival that day had circulated in 
the whole city, the station was filled with a huge crowd. Ten to fifteen thousand 
people gathered in the station. The crowd outside the station reached to the gate 
of the Grand National Assembly (Cumhuriyet 30.07.1946).
A similar story recurred on 1 April 1947, when Celâl Bayar, one of the founding 
members of the DP, visited Izmir. During that visit there was a public debate on 
the  scheduled  by-elections  in  Istanbul,  and  whether  the  Democrats  would 
boycott or participate. Whereas the government was blaming the Democrats – 
leaning towards boycott – for torpedoing democracy, the latter were playing the 
impartiality card against the Republicans. In this atmosphere, and one day after 
the  prime  minister’s  public  speech  in  Izmir,  Bayar  arrived  in  the  town 
surrounded by around twenty thousand cheerful inhabitants. He needed police 
assistance to walk through the streets of the Basmane neighborhood while he 
was  greeted  the  crowd.  It  took  several  hours  for  the  gathering  to  disperse 
(Cumhuriyet 02.04.1947).  Such rallies  may not  appear  the best  examples  of 
protest;  but  they  represented  burgeoning  dissent  towards  the  RPP  which 
encouraged public  masses  to  ardently  embrace  the  DP’s  elites  through such 
celebrations.
However, it should be noted that the DP’s mobilization of the masses did 
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not  only  pertain to  electoral  issues.  In  this  respect,  a  different  but  certainly 
relevant event took place on 8 May 1949 in Istanbul. This time the Democrats 
called for  a public demonstration against  the increasing costs  of  living.  The 
central Taksim Square was occupied by more than ten thousand people carrying 
hundreds of banners, DP flags, and caricatures. Several figures from the party’s 
senior  cadres  spoke  against  the  RPP’s  economic  performance  which  they 
associated  with  the  alienation  of  the  will  of  the  people  (Cumhuriyet 
09.05.1949). In other words, the democratic rhetoric of the DP was somewhat 
packaged in a critique of the economy. The meeting lasted about five hours, and 
again no incidents of public disorder or police intervention were recorded. 
A second example of mass protest behavior in the same period was the 
meetings to denounce communism (komünizmi telin). These initially began in 
the late 1940s with the instigation of certain nationalist youth circles such as the 
MTTB,  and  state-sponsored  labor  unions  (Anon.  1996b,  275–276). 
Mobilizations against communism, as one may expect, did not target any state 
or  government  institution,  and  often  involved  ruling  and  opposition  parties’ 
collaboration.  Yet  the  provocation  of  communist  ‘suspects’  was  common. 
Examples  included  meetings  held  in  various  provinces  such  as  Adana  (1 
January 1948), Malatya (10 April  1949), Eskişehir,  Ankara, and Istanbul (26 
August 1950) and Bursa (17 September 1950) to name just a few (see respective 
editions  of  Cumhuriyet).  Some  attracted  thousands  of  participants.  These 
meetings  continued  throughout  following  decades,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
December 22 1962 meeting organized by the Confederation of Turkish Trade 
Unions (TÜRK-İŞ). Anti-communist mobilization speaks about the roots of the 
prevalent  anti-leftist  rhetoric in the Turkish public discourse.  Yet aside from 
being a protest phenomenon, it is not plausible to consider these meeting within 
the frame of civil society engagement in democratic transition.     
   
The first interruption and re-installment of democracy: 1960-1961
Social and political background
In their  first  term in government,  the Democrats  enjoyed tremendous public 
support not only because they had dislodged the Republicans from office, but 
also  because  of  the  booming  economy.  Their  dedication  to  liberal  market 
principles  paid  off  well,  especially  in  the  agricultural  sector.  The  country’s 
infrastructure  improved  thanks  to  the  mechanization  of  agriculture,  and  the 
amount of cultivated land increased. Moreover, domestic social mobility began 
to accelerate due to the expanding network of land roads. This resulted in a 
growing supply of labor in the newly emerging industrial areas surrounding the 
urban centers in the west  (Kalaycıoğlu 1998, 40).  Together with agricultural 
development this was reflected in an average ten percent annual growth in the 
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economy.  Yet  the  Democrats  concentrated  too  much  on  short-term  gains. 
Zürcher (2004) points out that the DP government behaved shortsightedly when 
it  came  to  public  investments  and  the  distribution  of  cheap  credits,  mostly 
anticipating  immediate  growth.  They  lacked  long-term  plans  as  they  were 
allergic to the very idea of planning, and furthermore investments were widely 
sacrificed for political calculations (Zürcher 2004).
The optimism that characterized the Democrats’ first term thus began to 
erode from 1954 onwards. The DP was reelected in May 1954, but this time 
they faced serious problems. The economy was giving bad signals on several 
grounds. Why was this so? 
The insufficiency of  foreign  exchange to  meet  increasing imports  reached a 
peak.  The  decrease  in  agricultural  crops  because  of  the  drought,  the  low 
international  demand  for  agricultural  products,  the  hardening  difficulty  of 
getting loans and credits are the primary reasons (Demirel 2011, 251)  
As  a  consequence,  the  government  ended  with  inflationist  policies  which 
undermined the real income of the masses day by day.  Perhaps the severest 
measure was the devaluation of the currency by 330 percent in 1957, the effect 
of which was particularly detrimental for fixed salary earners. 
Although the Democrats survived early elections in the same year, their 
public support was no longer as secure as it had been at the beginning of the 
decade. This insecurity was filtered through a series of authoritarian measures 
indicating that the government wanted to control popular resentment. One was 
increased fines prescribed in the press law; another was the amendment of the 
public demonstrations law (1956) which ruled out all political party meetings 
except  for  electoral  propaganda,  submitted  protest  gatherings  to  governors’ 
permission, and gave the police the right to fire shots indiscriminately should 
demonstraors fail to disperse upon warning (Demirel 2011, 251). Meanwhile, 
the Republicans had been attacked by violent mobs on several occasions, and on 
one occasion the party leader, İnönü, , was not permitted to enter the city center 
in Kayseri where he was to attend a party congress by the city governor’s order 
(Eroğul 2003, 238). The relations between the DP and RPP were thus further 
strained. But certainly the most annoying of the government’s maneuvers came 
in April 1960, when it decided to establish an investigatory committee (tahkikat  
komisyonu) in the parliament to survey the media and all oppositional activities. 
The  committee  had  extraordinary  competences  that  ranged  from  banning 
publications  to  imposing  sanctions  for  political  demonstrations.  Criminal 
charges were foreseen for those who challenged the measures of the committee. 
(Turkish Official Gazette 10491, 28.04.1960). The Democrats had begun to act 
like the Republicans under single party rule, unable to stand for any opposition 
in society.
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Student protests of April 28-29, 1960
The repercussions of the Investigatory Committee were strong among young 
university  students.  Following  the  violent  repression  of  a  medical  students’ 
congress  in  Istanbul  by  police  (Milliyet 28.04.1960),  students  of  Istanbul 
University decided to protest against the Committee which they claimed was 
unconstitutional. Several students from different faculties walked to dozens of 
dormitories in the town to circulate the news about the protest throughout the 
night. The next day, a law student announced the demonstration in a lecture hall, 
and thousands of students gathered in the campus garden (Kabacalı 2007, 123). 
Soon after the students began protesting, police squads arrived to disperse 
the gathering. Faced by the students’ resistance, the police used gas bombs and 
firearms against them. The protest spread outside the campus and continued on 
Beyazıt  Square, and students then marched to the governor’s building in the 
Eminönü district. In the meantime, violent clashes with the police continued for 
hours,  and military forces were called in.  Two students,  Turan Emeksiz and 
Nedim Özpolat,  died: Turan was shot by police firing on the protesters,  and 
Nedim was crushed between the pallets of a military tank. Dozens of others 
were injured, including several  policemen. Martial law was declared in both 
Istanbul and Ankara; all public meetings and assemblies were outlawed, and it 
was also prohibited to publish news about the events of April 28. In addition, all 
universities in Istanbul were closed for one month (Feyizoğlu 1993, 21–22).  
The following day, hundreds of students at the political science and law 
faculties  at  Ankara  University  assembled  on  campus  to  protest  against  the 
violent repression of the demonstrations in Istanbul.  They were prevented in 
their  attempt  to  leave the university  building by the martial  law authorities; 
police  and  military  forces  arrived  rapidly,  and  suppressed  the  students  with 
firearms.  The  Ministry  of  the  Interior  declared  that  11  students  had  been 
wounded,  and 58 arrested.  Again,  all  reports  about  the  Ankara  events  were 
banned  (Feyizoğlu  1993,  26).  The  same  day,  university  students  in  Izmir 
organized three separate ‘quiet’ marches. In this case, the police did not take the 
hardline approach but ‘kindly’ asked protestors to disperse at  the end of the 
marches. As a results no incidents were been reported (Milliyet 30.04.1960). 
The Coup
The role of the military in Turkish history has been the subject of a long debate 
stretching back before the Republic to the Ottoman era. Suffice it to say here 
that  the  tradition  of  a  politically  involved  Turkish  military  was  broadly 
perpetuated in the last  century.  Specifically,  prior  to the coup in May 1960, 
discontent  with  the  Democrats  within  the  armed  forces  was  particularly 
widespread among young officers. Amongst several other reasons, the fact that 
20
the social status of these officers had deteriorated due to the absolute decrease in 
their  real  incomes,  and  their  pessimism regarding their  professional  futures, 
were influential. Karpat’s (1970) anecdote aptly captures the story I am trying to 
elucidate here:
Many of the officers I interviewed after the Revolution [he refers to the coup] 
complained that in the 1950’s some landlords would not even bother to show 
them houses for rent, for “they could not afford it”; some store owners looked 
annoyed at the prospect of showing expensive items to this impoverished group; 
waiters  with  an  eye  on  tips  preferred  to  serve  richer  customers;  and  even 
mothers, who had once been highly honored to have officers as sons-in-law, 
often advised their daughters not to marry men with “shiny uniforms but empty 
pockets.” (Karpat 1970, 1663)
They were also annoyed that some of the top ranking generals maintained good 
terms with the Democrats in order to secure their position. For them, this further 
degraded their ‘honorable’ identity, as they generally looked down on politicians 
upon whom they did not want to rely to rise in their careers. Coupled with their 
self-ascribed historical  role as not only guardians but  also proprietors of the 
regime, young officers’ resentment flared up. The “incident of the 9 officers” (9 
subay olayı) in December 1957 revealed that some small factions were already 
planning to stage a coup (Demirel 2011, 289). That attempt was unsuccessful, 
but three years later the situation was different. On May 21 1960, a sizeable 
crowd of military school students marched on Kızılay Square in Ankara as if 
carrying the message  of  the intervention  that  would  occur  within  the  week. 
Indeed, on May 27, Colonel Alparslan Türkeş initiated the takeover with, he 
claimed,  the  ultimate  aim  to  “extricate  the  parties  from  the  irreconcilable 
situation  into  which  they  had  fallen”  (Zürcher  2004,  241).  Thereby,  young 
officers  succeeded in overthrowing the government  without  reference  to  the 
chain of command within the army. 
Drafting a new constitution and bringing democracy back in: a civil society  
contribution?
After the coup, the incumbent officers formed the Committee of National Union 
(hereafter CNU) headed by General Cemal Gürsel. Composed of 38 officers, the 
CNU replaced the civilian government,  but  how long they would remain in 
power was not clear at first. This was particularly because the CNU members 
lacked  consensus.  Some  were  in  favor  of  large  scale  political  reforms  and 
remaining in power for a prolonged period, others planned to devolve authority 
to a civilian government after a few months; still others had no clear plan in 
mind. Hence, these different factions skirmished over the roadmap, and tried to 
eliminate each other from the power struggle. Eventually, the moderates who 
favored a quick transition to civilian rule took the upper hand by overcoming 
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their opponents.
In August 1960 the activities of the Democratic Party were suspended. 
The party elites were tried by a supreme court appointed by the CNU5. In effect, 
the military junta wanted to install a political regime that would not allow any 
government  to  become  ‘too  powerful’.  This  was  to  be  achieved  through 
institutional  guarantees  such  as  a  constitutional  court  and other  autonomous 
mechanisms.  Whether  the  military  was  truly  concerned  with  checks  and 
balances  to  make  Turkish  democracy  durable  is  however  an  open question. 
Above all, they were championing a system that would safeguard the military’s 
privileged position and ability to take over civilian politics6. For that purpose, 
the CNU facilitated the formation of a constituent assembly in December 1960. 
The  assembly  was  given  the  task  of  drafting  a  new  constitution.  The  new 
governmental system was to be bicameral in structure. The first chamber was to 
host  the members of  the CNU itself;  while  the second chamber,  named the 
House of the Representatives (Temsilciler Meclisi), was to be composed of the 
representatives of political parties and various organizations. The latter included 
“bars, media, unions of veterans, artisan bodies, youth, labor unions, chambers, 
teachers  organizations,  agricultural  institutions,  universities  and  judiciary 
bodies” (Gençkaya 1998, 23).      
Thus on paper various civil society groups could contribute to the drafting 
of  a  new constitution.  Indirectly,  they  were  to  become the  engineers  of  the 
democratic order fabricated by the constitution. Nevertheless, this ‘civil society’ 
had an overly enlightened character, with the intelligentsia over-represented and 
grassroots links generally missing.
Only  a  few  members  of  labor  unions  were  present  in  the  assembly,  while 
landless and impoverished peasants did not have any representative. Therefore, 
the  real  debate  during  the  negotiations  took  place  between  reformist 
intelligentsia, politicians, and representatives of the agricultural sector. Class-
based representation  was  absent.  Liberal  and reformist  attempts  were  rather 
supported by enlightened groups such as civil servants, writers, and teachers 
(Gençkaya 1998, 24).
Two  factors  show  that  this  was  genuinely  the  case.  The  results  of  the 
constitutional  referendum  in  the  summer  of  1961  revealed  that  almost  40 
percent  of  the  populace  rejected  the  new  constitution,  despite  strong 
manipulation from above. But probably the bigger surprise came in October of 
5Thirty-one were given  life  sentences,  another  fifteen  received  capital  punishment.  Only three  were finally 
executed, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, and Finance Minister 
Refik Koraltan.
6This  was  to  be  done  by instituting  a  National  Security  Council  (Milli  Güvenlik  Kurulu).  Headed  by the 
President, and composed of top army generals and members of the government the Council was to discuss daily 
political issues. 
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the same year when the general elections took place. The newly formed Justice 
Party, which more or less succeeded the Democrats in terms of their political 
posture,  received  35  percent  of  the  votes  compared  to  36  percent  for  the 
Republicans. In a way, the bulk of the population thus sent the message that 
they were not happy with the military takeover, the extinction of the DP, and the 
installment  of  a  new political  order.  By  contrast,  many  actors  within  ‘civil 
society’ such as the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Koç 2010, 173) 
celebrated the military takeover almost unconditionally. This confirms Kayalı’s 
(2009) analysis that the coup and the politics it manufactured overwhelmingly 
relied on a social compromise between the military and an elitist intelligentsia 
which assumed a superior position over the rest of society. 
Protest
Between the breakdown of parliamentary democracy and its reinstatement in 
late 1961, protest was a highly costly option. Still, contentious action was not 
entirely  absent,  even  if  not  a  routine  practice,  and  this  despite  closed 
opportunities for mobilization. Here, I will mention three cases.
One was a symbolic yet  truly effective protest  action by a number of 
university rectors. After the military takeover, the junta decided to expel 147 
professors  from  their  universities  for  political  reasons.  Aggrieved  by  this 
decision,  the  rectors  of  Istanbul  University  (Sıddık  Sami  Onar),  Istanbul 
Technical University (Fikret Narter), Ankara University (Suat Kemal Yetkin), 
Middle  East  Technical  University  (Turhan  Feyzioğlu),  and  Ege  University 
(Mustafa  Uluöz)  resigned,  together  with several  faculty  members.  It  was an 
unexpected move since these figures were not real opponents of the coup as 
such.  Eventually,  their  collective  resignation  paved  the  way  for  the 
reappointment of the expelled professors, albeit as late as March 1962 (Zürcher 
2004, 354; Milliyet 29.10.1960).
A second example was workers’ protests, which mounted towards the end 
of 1961. The initial  central objective of these protests was to demand a law 
granting  the  right  to  strike  and  collective  agreements.  In  fact,  the  new 
constitution recognized these rights, but legislation for their implementation was 
missing.  On  25  November  1961  a  few  thousand  workers  –  many  of  them 
barefoot  –  rallied  in  Konak  Square  in  Izmir  under  the  banner  of  the  local 
federation of labor unions. They also raised complaints about low salaries, for 
which  they  blamed  the  Arbitration  Committee  charged  with  resolving  labor 
conflicts. (Milliyet 26.11.1961). One month later, workers organized the biggest 
labor protest in the republic’s so far. The Istanbul Federation of Labor Unions 
(the local branch of TÜRK-İŞ) called for a mass meeting to voice the same 
demands as those seen in Izmir. 100.000 workers from various towns arrived in 
Istanbul, and assembled on Saraçhane Square. 3000 policemen were scrambled 
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to secure public order which was not disrupted during the event. The workers 
carried banners with slogans such as “Unions without strikes are like soldiers 
without  arms!”,  “He  who  considers  striking  a  crime  is  criminal  himself!”, 
“Misery destroys the morality of  society!” and so forth (Anon. 1996c,  566–
568). Yet, they had to wait two more years until legislation was passed by the 
parliament.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  anti-communist  rhetoric  was  still 
prevalent among the participants. 
A third  example  regards  the  protests  of  students  unable  to  enroll  at 
university. These high school graduates criticized the low quotas allotted for 
new students at the universities. They organized events for several weeks from 
late  October  1961  onwards,  mostly  in  Ankara  and  Istanbul.  Although 
participation was not massive, the form of their collective action varied from 
demonstrations in front of the universities and governorships to hunger strikes 
and  occupations  of  central  squares.  On  November  25  1961 a  group  of  one 
hundred students went as far as to enter the Ministry of Education building, 
chanting  slogans  such  as  “Either  science/education  or  death!”  (Milliyet 
26.11.1961).  The  outcome  of  these  protests  was  not  totally  inconsequential, 
even if it did not fully meet the students’ demands. The universities in Istanbul 
and Ankara announced increases in their quotas to a certain extent. 
The coup d’etat of September 12 1980 and the re-resumption of democracy 
in 1983: civil society destroyed  
Turkish parliamentary democracy was repealed once again on 12 September 
1980. This was in actual fact the military’s third irruption into politics (after 
March 12 1971). The parliament was dissolved for a second time. This time, the 
return to democratic practices took longer than it had after the first takeover in 
1960.  The consequences of  the coup were also much more brutal,  and civil 
society was nearly eradicated. In other words, civil  society was left  with no 
possible channel to partake in the transition to democracy. Hence, there is little 
to  say  here about  civil  society’s  contribution to  the transition.  A few words 
concerning the junta and the scheduled re-installment of democracy will serve 
to lay bare the notorious story. 
Politics and society towards the coup
The constitutional regime of 1961 brought some advantages for associational 
life  in  Turkey.  The  relatively  liberal  interpretation  of  organizational  rights 
cemented a fairly vibrant civil society sector. This vibrancy was followed by 
intensified  politicization  towards  the  end  of  the  decade,  which  was  also 
influenced by the international context, such as the 1968 protests, anti-Vietnam 
mobilizations and so on. Confrontations with government authorities became 
frequent,  especially  in  the  case  of  student  mobilizations.  Consequently,  the 
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military memorandum of 1971 was a law-and-order response to the escalating 
“anarchy, fratricidal fight, social and economic unrest”(Milliyet 13.03.1971). It 
held the government and the parliament responsible for this, and reminded the 
civil authorities of a likely takeover unless the politicians righted the allegedly 
chaotic  conditions.  Violent  events  such as  the  ‘Bloody Sunday’ of  February 
19697 and the 15-16 June 1971 labor protests8 were emblematic of the turbulent 
climate on the grounds of which the memorandum was justified. A plethora of 
constitutional  amendments  followed,  but  the  parliament  and political  parties 
endured. 
However, politics and society after 1971 did not prove any more tame. 
After a short term under a technocratic government, political polarization “came 
to characterize not  only  the parties,  but  was  insinuated  into other  important 
social sectors as well, including organized labor, the teaching profession, the 
civil bureaucracy, and even the police” (Tachau and Heper 1983, 24). At the 
level of political elites, governments throughout the 1970s were highly volatile 
as they were replaced nine times with different cabinet makeups. The main axis 
of power was divided between two main competitors, the RPP, which espoused 
a social-democratic ideology under the leadership of Ecevit, and the center-right 
Justice Party led by Demirel. They were followed by two other candidates for 
unstable coalitions: “(1) Necmettin Erbakan’s National Salvation Party (NSP), 
which  emphasized  Islamic,  fundamentalist  principles;  and  (2)  Alparslan 
Turkes’s  Nationalist  Action  Party  (NAP),  which  supported  a  protofascist 
program  of  domestic  corporatism,  pan-Turkic  irredentism,  and  a  uniformed 
youth organization known as the ‘Grey Wolves’” (Gunter 1989, 64). Since none 
of  these  parties  could  secure  a  parliamentary  majority9 coalitions  were 
inevitable;  but  the  lack  of  compromise  on  almost  all  issues  stalemated 
governments in political deadlocks and impasses. Respective governments were 
also  challenged  by  external  influences  such  as  the  1973  Oil  Crisis,  which 
exacerbated the problems in the domestic economy, already destabilized by the 
failures of ISI policies. 
At  the  societal  level,  polarization  was  accompanied  by  widespread 
7On February 16 1969 a large group of students and youth organizations sought to protest against the arrival of  
the 6th Fleet of the U.S. Armed Forces in Istanbul. The protest was interrupted by anti-communist counter-
demonstrators. As a result of the clashes between the two groups, 2 people died, and another 114 were injured.
8On  June  15-16  1970  a  huge  mass  of  workers,  mostly  organized  by  the  Revolutionary  Workers  Unions  
Federation (DISK), protested against amendments to the laws on unions, strikes and lockouts in Istanbul. The 
first day, 70.000 workers in different parts of the city marched without many clashes with the security forces.  
The second day,  protests  continued with the participation of 100.000, but this time clashes with the police 
resulted in 4 casualties and around 200 injuries.  Martial law was declared for 60 days.  For Cemil Koçak’s 
narrative,  see  http://www.stargazete.com/guncel/yazar/cemil-kocak/donum-noktasi-olamayan-eylem-15-16-
haziran-isci-direnisi-haber-443591.htm
9The robust PR system introduced after 1960 made it especially difficult for any party to keep a majority in the  
parliament.
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militancy  and  radicalization.  The  military  memorandum represented  a  short 
break  in  insurgent  activities  through  the  mass  incarceration  and  killing  of 
political  opponents.  For  instance,  revolutionary  groups  such  as  the  Turkish 
People’s Liberation Army (TPLA) and the Turkish People’s Liberation Front 
(TPLF)  became  targets  of  “a  major  anti-terrorist  campaign”  whereby  “the 
security forces managed to either kill or capture almost the whole leadership 
cadres of  both” (Sayarı  1987, 25).  The second half of the decade,  however, 
witnessed an upsurge in political  violence from both leftwing and rightwing 
extremists. On the left of the spectrum were organizations such as DEV-SOL 
and  DEV-YOL,  established  by  people  in  secondary  positions  in  the 
organizations mentioned previously. Rightwing radicalism, on the other hand, 
“had usually started out in the paramilitary groups organized by the extreme 
right-wing  National  Action  Party  (NAP)”  (Sayarı  1987,  26).  There  were 
interrelated  factions  such  as  the  Idealist  Clubs  Association  (Ülkü  Ocakları  
Derneği),  Idealist  Path  Association  (Ülkü  Yolu  Derneği)  and  Idealist  Youth 
Association (Idealist Youth Association). 
Comparing  Turkey’s  experience  with  political  violence  with  those  of 
other countries such as Italy and West Germany during the late 1970s, Sayarı 
notes that it “caused more fatalities in one week during the early months of 
1980 in Turkey than it did in Italy in an entire year or in West Germany in the 
entire decade” (Sayari 2010, 198). Indeed, Gunter documents “a total of 9795 
incidents of clashes and armed attacks during the overall period”, of which 6732 
were “incidents of arson and throwing of explosives” (Gunter 1989, 69). Among 
these, political assassinations had a particularly destabilizing effect.
Political assassinations came to include members of the parliament, an ex-prime 
minister, prominent journalists, and university professors. Some of the victims 
were extremists of left or right but others (particularly among journalists and 
professors)  were  moderates.  The  latter  type  of  assassination  was  clearly 
designed  to  undermine  the  political  center  and  accelerate  the  process  of 
polarization (Tachau and Heper 1983, 24-25).  
      
Outbursts of ethnic or sectarian conflict exacerbated the situation10. Under these 
circumstances, Turkish generals already critical of political leaders did not have 
a hard time justifying their takeover in September 1980, the third military coup 
in the Republic’s history.
The Coup and transition: a familiar story   
Differently to 1960, the coup in 1980 was instigated by the military leadership, 
and the junta regime was institutionalized with the National Security Council 
(NSC)  presided  by  Kenan  Evren.  Leaders  of  political  parties  were  kept  in 
10For a historical narrative of the events in Malatya, Çorum, and Kahramanmaraş, see Şahhüseyinoğlu (2005).
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custody, all political activities were suspended, martial law prevailed, and tens 
of  thousands  of  unionists,  students  and  activists  were  arrested  as  political 
suspects.  As  in  1960,  a  schedule  for  a  new  constitution  and  transition  to 
electoral  democracy  was  prepared.  This  would  once  again  be  the  task  of  a 
constituent assembly (June 1981); the NSC as the first chamber, and an advisory 
council as a second (Danışma Meclisi), one third of which was to be selected by 
the NSC itself (Tanör 2008, 137–138).
The drafting of the 1961 Constitution allowed the participation of some 
civil society representatives, at least on paper and despite an elitist agenda. The 
process for drafting the new constitution twenty years later was definitely a step 
backwards in this respect. Not only was the civilian contribution overly limited, 
any negative propaganda and criticism of the draft was prohibited. Indeed, an 
NSC decision (Turkish Official Gazette 17845, 21.10.1982) proclaimed that “it 
is  not  allowed to  criticize  the  advocatory  speeches  of  the  head of  the  state 
concerning the new constitution on radio-television and during his travels in the 
country; and to make any written or oral declaration against them”.  
For non-state actors, thus, there was no other option but quiescence or 
praise  of  the military,  illiberal  constitutional  draft  that  followed.  To give  an 
example from organized labor, Koç (2010) recalls the welcoming message from 
the TÜRK-İŞ confederation delivered to the head of the NSC, Kenan Evren, 
soon after the coup. By the same token, quiescence was not an inexorably safe 
option,  as  illustrated  by  the  case  of  the  Revolutionary  Workers  Unions 
Federation  (DİSK,  established  in  1967).  Their  members  thought  that  by 
remaining silent (not challenging the coup) they could avoid military repression. 
“Yet those who were expecting release shortly after being arrested and without 
mistreatment, were tortured and imprisoned for years” (Koç 2010, 280). 
Consequently, it was not surprising to most that more than ninety percent 
of the electorate endorsed the constitution in the referendum held in November 
1982. According to one interpretation, this was not only due to the imposed lack 
of counter-propaganda, but also because many people preferred a flawed yet 
immediate  democratic  transition  to  an  extended  junta  regime  (Tanör  2008). 
After the referendum, a new law on political parties was passed, and new parties 
were formed. These were the center-right Motherland Party of Turgut Özal, the 
social democratic Populist Party that to some extent substituted the RPP, and the 
Nationalist  Democracy Party supported by the junta. In November 1983, the 
Turkish electorate disappointed the junta by casting 45 percent of its votes for 
the Motherland Party.   
In a nutshell, the transition to democracy after 1980-1983 appears a one-
player game, but it would be misleading to imagine the military as the single 
actor in this process. Ihsan Dagi (1996) points to the role of external actors such 
as the then European Community and the United States in pressuring the junta 
to  haste  in  the  resumption of  democracy.  In  that  sense,  West  Germany and 
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France initially took up the issues of political refugees and the trials of unionists 
through  diplomatic  channels,  expressing  their  concerns  about  human  rights 
under military rule. Yet this pressure did not yield any convincing response from 
the junta in terms of desisting from political  repression.  Thus,  the European 
Community  went  further,  changing  the  strategy.  One  idea  which  became 
popular among European socialists was that the EC should “suspend Turkey’s 
association  agreement  with the Community,  as  had happened in the case  of 
Greece  in  1967  following  the  colonels’ coup”  (Dagi  1996,  129).  The  other 
strategy regarded the increased economic aid of 600 million ECU that had been 
planned for Turkey following the signature of a fourth financial protocol . The 
EC, “by threatening not to release the aid, used it to pressure Turkey over a 
rapid return to democracy and respect for human rights” (Ibid, 130). The USA, 
on the other  hand, used softer  language in  lobbying for  democracy,  without 
criticizing the military’s being in power to any great extent11. These were two 
big challenges for the junta, since non-compliance with the West would not only 
be self-contradictory  for  a  western-oriented  army,  but  also  mean the loss of 
material gains. It is, therefore, plausible to claim that the generals’ decision to 
begin the democratic transition was influenced by these external pressures and 
their wish to avoid Turkey’s isolation in the international arena. 
Protest
Newspaper reports on the protest events that took place in this period are almost 
exclusively about demonstrations in foreign countries. The self-censorship that 
the media widely resorted to may have played a part in the non-coverage of 
domestic  events.  Yet  this hardly changes the fact  that  protest  became a rare 
phenomenon under the conditions described above. There is, however, one case 
which deserves particular attention here.
A few months after the general elections in 1983, on 15 May 1984, a 
petition was sent to the office of the Presidency and to the chief office of the 
Grand  National  Assembly.  The  title  of  the  petition  was  “Observations  and 
Demands Concerning the Democratic  Order in Turkey”.  It  was written by a 
group of  intellectuals  during  a  series  of  private  meetings,  and  subsequently 
signed  by  around  1400  people.  Publicly  known  as  the  Petition  of  the 
Intellectuals,  the  document  addressed  political  repression  and  human  rights 
issues related to the junta regime. The petition started with the statement that the 
petitioners  had  chosen  this  way  of  raising  their  dissent  because  of  legal 
constraints they did not agree with. Then, it juxtaposed several criticisms of the 
restrictions on political and organizational rights and liberties, criminal charges 
against  civil  society  actors  and  political  activists;  and  the  mistreatment  of 
11At any rate, the U.S. administration was most likely less alarmed by a compliant military junta than an Islamic 
revolution as seen in Iran at around the same time, or indeed by a Turkey under socialist influence. 
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arrestees and prisoners. 
In  light  of  these  considerations,  we are  aware  of  our  responsibilities  to  our 
society,  and  sincerely  believe;  that  modern  democracy has  a  stable  essence 
despite changes in practices in different countries and their specific conditions; 
that the institutions and principles as the makeup of this essence are already 
acknowledged by our nation; that legal regulations and practices in breach of 
these principles should be lifted through democratic methods; that we can thus 
overcome the depression in a healthy and secure way12.
 
The day that the petition was posted, the martial law authorities in Ankara baned 
the public release of the document. A few days later, the military prosecutors 
launched an investigation into the document, and on June 20 the martial law 
court in Ankara opened a trial, initially against 46 people (which then became 
59) for unlawfully circulating a petition. The trial lasted two years and all the 
suspects were acquitted in February 1986 (Aydınlar Dilekçesi Davası 1986). By 
virtue  of  the  fact  that  the  Petition  of  the  Intellectuals  was  perhaps  the  first 
collective and organized initiative against the measures of the military regime 
and  the  illiberal  democracy  that  it  constituted,  the  document  has  particular 
relevance within the frames of this report. 
The recent trajectory of democracy and civil society
The Turkish story does not end in 1983 however. In the last thirty years, the 
regime has experienced various constellations of democratic enhancement and 
erosion. For instance, the ways in which the Kurdish insurgency has been dealt 
with, as Larry Diamond (1999) reminds us, has undermined the advancement of 
liberal  understandings  of  democratic  principles  in  the  country.  The 
‘management  of  social  conflict’  in  this  particular  case  definitely  did  not 
‘facilitate’ consolidation (Valenzuela 1990), indeed it obstructed its progression. 
Furthermore, the transition in 1983 did not truly safeguard civilian politics from 
military influence. Most notoriously, the National Security Council13 decisions 
of February 28 1997 signified a soft coup targeting the Islamist ‘threat’ posed by 
the Welfare Party’s presence in the governing coalition. The government was 
practically forced to resign while additional measures, such as closing down a 
number of preachers’ schools, were taken to pacify Islamist currents in society. 
Apparently, it  was the institutional guarantees bestowed by what Casper and 
Taylor  (1996)  call  the  “compromise  path  to  democratic  installation”  that 
assigned  this  high  level  of  discretion  to  manipulate  politics  to  the  Turkish 
Armed Forces.
12For the whole text of the “Petition of the Intellectuals”, see: http://bianet.org/biamag/bianet/19444-aydinlar-
dilekcesi-tam-metni
13Not to be confused with the NSC of the junta regime.
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The anchor of prospective EU membership, on the other hand, represents 
an external stimulus for overcoming the authoritarian legacy through political 
reforms. As of 1999, Turkey became an official candidate state, and the period 
between  2002  and  2005  witnessed  a  series  of  reform  (e.g.  harmonization) 
packages that furthered the cause of freedom and democracy to a certain extent. 
Many observers believed that Turkey was “in the midst of going from a hybrid 
regime that blended elements of democracy, autocracy, and pluralism to one that 
is more liberal  and democratic” (Diamond et al. 2003, xviii). However, as the 
euphoria of rapprochement with the EU faded away for various reasons, and as 
the AKP secured a growing power base through subsequent elections, the liberal 
and democratic opening proved ephemeral.  Students,  journalists and Kurdish 
politicians have been imprisoned; the rule of law has been thwarted by courts 
with extraordinary competences; the opposition media has been pacified, and so 
forth. All this signals an authoritarian backlash that is becoming increasingly 
clear. 
A limited frame for civil society     
Since 1983, Turkey has experienced a certain degree of institutionalization in 
the realm of social movements and civil society. Indeed, associational life began 
to reemerge, at least in quantitative terms, while various forms of new social 
movements  burgeoned  in  organizational  diversity.  This  was  largely  due  to 
piecemeal liberalization within the regime which gradually lifted restrictions on 
political  activity.  However,  the  mandate  of  the  1982  Constitution,  despite 
subsequent  amendments,  by  no  means  allowed  a  high  degree  of  political 
freedom. In other words, political activity was condoned as long as it remained 
within the margins of the mainstream. Organizing within civil society was also 
promoted  over  apolitical  ventures  (see  page  32).  By  the  same  token,  state 
repression, primarily of leftist and Kurdish activists, continued at various levels 
through clandestine (e.g. murders), judicial (e.g. State Security Courts, and after 
2002, courts with extraordinary competences) and street (e.g. protest policing) 
forms. 
The labor movement
Between the end of the 1980s and the late 1990s, Turkish labor became a salient 
actor in democratic politics. To date, labor unions have mobilized on the street 
more  than  any  other  organizations.  Nevertheless,  political  opportunities  for 
labor to influence governmental processes – even to the extent of provoking 
resignations – were more favorable in the previous decade than in the 2000s. 
Indeed, the division in the political elite that led to the instability of coalitions 
characterized almost the entire decade of the 1990s. Coupled with a fluctuating 
economy that saw crises as in 1994 and high inflation and corruption scandals, 
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labor unions emerged as powerful actors with the ability to bargain effectively 
with  employers  and  to  mobilize  large  sections  of  the  population.  In  the 
succeeding decade, unions also had strong reasons to mobilize due to continued 
neoliberal policies such as massive privatization. Yet the ruling elites were no 
longer divided but united under the expanding conservative equilibrium of the 
AKP government. Moreover, economic stability reigned and was marketed well, 
and government-friendly unions largely broadened their shop-floor bases.    
After  the  junta  regime,  the  rightwing  ANAP  government  under  the 
leadership of Özal  committed to the profound liberalization of the economy. 
Their  first  term  from 1983  to  1987  was  also  marked  by  strong  anti-union 
policies. Not surprisingly, the consequences for workers in public and private 
enterprises  were  detrimental.  Real  wages  dropped  by  7  and  12  per  cent 
respectively on the basis of wholesale and consumer prices (Boratav 2008, 192). 
By 1988, for public workers the figures amounted to a decline of almost 50 per 
cent since 1983, whereas the decrease for civil servants was around 20 per cent 
(Koç  2010,  335).  Under  these  circumstances,  the  deadlock  in  collective 
bargaining talks between TÜRK-İŞ and employer associations in 1989 fanned 
the well-known Spring Actions (Bahar Eylemleri) that lasted from March until 
May of the same year. 600.000 workers participated in a wide variety of events 
that  included but were not  limited to “slowing down and late-starting work, 
collective medical visits, food and bus service boycott, beard boycott14,  quiet 
marches,  stoppage,  sit-in,  obstruction  of  traffic,  collective  petitioning  for 
divorce” (Çelik 1996, 103). These actions were not only economically but also 
politically motivated, and relied on notable media and public support. Indeed, 
mass sympathy for the Spring Actions was reinforced “by the reaction against 
the residues of the September 12 (junta) regime and the Özal government, as 
well as by widespread demands for democratization” (Çelik 1996, 104). The 
outcomes proved highly positive for  the workers as  the government  granted 
large salary increases.
In the following years, Turkish labor persisted in eventful mobilization. 
The  temporal  distribution  of  strike  activity  in  the  country  (Figure  1)  is 
presumably  a  blueprint  for  the  the  intensification  of  contention  seen  in  the 
1990s.  Mass  meetings  and  rallies  were  quite  common,  and  the  level  of 
participation in a series of demonstrations in 1994 and 1995 in particular was 
reportedly very high, even at those of an illegal nature (e.g. 100.000 in Ankara 
on November 26 1994; 300.000 in Ankara on August 5 1995; 100.000 in Ankara 
on October 15 1995). At times these demonstrations also played a remarkable 
role in pushing cabinets out of office.
TÜRK-İŞ became influential three times in governmental change. By means of 
pressuring the RPP, TÜRK-İŞ played a decisive role in the RPP’s withdrawal 
14Growing beards to boycott the dress code of the workplace. 
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from the coalition government on September 20, 1995, when big strikes were 
commenced within the public sector. The demonstration and the stance on the 
Kızılay Square on October 15, 1995, hindered the positive vote of confidence 
for the Tansu Çiller  (center-right True Path Party)  government.  In 1997, the 
impact of the Initiative of the Fives15 (Beşli Girişim), of which TÜRK-İŞ was a 
party, on the resignation of the REFAHYOL government (Islamist Welfare Party 
and True Path Party) was significant (Koç 2010, 415).
Figure 1 – Official strike statistics in Turkey (1984-2008)
Source: ILO
Yet  the  link  between  this  high  level  of  mobilization  and  the  democratic 
orientations of the labor is not beyond dispute. In 1987, for instance, during a 
referendum concerning the abolition of political bans on ex-politicians from the 
pre-junta period, TÜRK-İŞ campaigned for these to be lifted. Ten years later, by 
contrast, when the military, alarmed by the Islamic currents of the Welfare Party 
in the governing coalition, ‘softly’ intervened in politics at the National Security 
Council  meeting  of  February  28  1997,  TÜRK-İŞ  took  a  joint  pro-military 
posture in the group of the aforementioned Initiative of the Fives (Koç 2010). 
By  the  same  token,  the  recently  formed  KESK  (Confederation  of  Public 
Employees’ Unions), together with a number of vocational associations,16 were 
critical  of  the  undemocratic  pressures  on  the  government  provoked  by  the 
15Besides TÜRK-İŞ, the Initiative was composed of the Revolutionary Workers Unions Confederation (DİSK), 
the  Confederation  of  Turkish  Tradesmen and Craftsmen (TESK),  the  Union of  Chambers  and  Commodity 
Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), and the Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations (TİSK).  
16Turkish  Dental  Association,  Turkish  Pharmacist  Association,  Turkish  Chambers  Union  of  Architects  and 
Engineers, and Turkish Medical Association.  
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imminent ‘Islamist threat’ (Çelik 2012). This indicates two things. First, Turkish 
labor’s  relationship  with  democracy  not  only  reflected  the  ideologically 
fragmented nature of the unions, but also the slippery ground on which at least 
some of them positioned themselves with regard to democratization and de-
democratization. Second, an inherently pro-democratic spirit did not uniformly 
underpin the contentious politics the unions pursued.
The  ambivalent  character  of  the  labor  movement’s  relation  with 
democracy  also  prevailed  in  the  2000s.  In  this  respect,  the  golden  age  of 
Turkey’s alignment with the EU in the first half of that decade was perhaps the 
least  contested  field  across  different  segments  of  the  labor  movement.  In 
general, labor representatives did not categorically oppose EU membership as 
such,  nor  the  political  reforms  implemented  under  the  auspices  of 
harmonization.  Criticisms  either  revolved around specific  political  dilemmas 
such as the Cyprus problem, voiced especially by nationalist confederations like 
KAMUSEN,  or  centered  upon  the  rejection  of  an  ‘imposed’  path  of 
Europeanization  that  would  allegedly  thwart  national  independence  or 
undermine  the  principles  of  social  democracy  (Bal  2007).  Otherwise,  many 
unions  invested  in  transnational  networks  with  their  counterparts  at  the  EU 
level, at times receiving resources from them (Öngün 2011), and elsewhere built 
up solidarity for striking workers (Fougner and Kurtoğlu 2011) or occasionally 
partook in “joint projects, seminars, workshops and other activities, which are 
often  organized  either  by  the  EU  institutions  or  by  trade  unions  and 
confederations in Europe” (Agartan 2010). Yet when it came to certain cleavage 
structures in society, e.g. on the Kurdish issue, the status of Muslim and non-
Muslim minorities, civilian-military relations and so on, the divided nature of 
labor  translated  into  a  lack  of  shared  understanding  over  further 
democratization.  Still,  unions  such  as  KESK and  its  affiliated  unions,  more 
active  in  terms  of  contentious  politics  and  relatively  independent  from the 
political  mainstream,  mobilize  frequently  for  the  drafting  of  a  pluralist 
constitution, education in mother tongues (for Kurds in particular) and against 
the state’s repression of unionists and tough police strategies on the street.  
(Pro-) Kurdish activists
The  Kurdish  question  in  Turkey  maintains  a  paradoxical  relation  with 
democracy.  Whatever  the  actors  involved,  the  politicization  of  the  Kurdish 
identity  definitely  unveils  the  blatant  fact  that  the  advancement  of  Turkish 
democracy is dependent on the resolution of that conflict. Yet at the same time 
this historically rooted question has turned into the battlefield of the severest 
repressive strategies of authoritarian statecraft in the face of an ongoing armed 
insurgency.  
The centrality of the PKK in the Kurdish conflict is hard to deny, yet it is 
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equally true that “(L)ittle serious attention has been given to the efficacy of non-
violent domestic struggles to reform Turkish state policies towards Kurds or to 
pro-Kurdish use of electoral politics to promote the movement’s goals” (Watts 
2006,  125).  In  that  sense,  the  representation  of  the  Kurdish  movement  in 
parliament played a pivotal role both for the recognition of the Kurdish identity 
and for the chance for the pluralist practice of democracy. Before establishing 
their  own  party(ies),  Kurdish  politicians  allied  themselves  with  the  (now 
defunct)  Social  Democratic  People’s  Party  (SHP),  founded  in  1986. 
Nevertheless,  some  SHP  members  were  uncomfortable  with  the  public 
pronouncements  of  Kurdish  ethno-politics  under  the  SHP  banner,  which 
eventually  led  to  the  expulsion  of  (pro-)Kurdish  politicians  from the  party 
(Robins 1993, 666; Kirişci and Winrow 1997, 136–137). Soon after,  in June 
1990, the first  of  the successor Kurdish political  parties,  the People’s  Labor 
Party (HEP), was founded. 
Besides objectives related to cultural and linguistic rights,  the political 
agenda articulated at the party level resonated with the ideas of pluralism, self-
government  and  critiques  of  the  (over-)centralized  nature  of  state 
administration. However, the enunciation of such a political discourse at all, let 
alone through parliamentary channels, was highly controversial in the domestic 
situation  of  the  1990s.  Indeed,  Turkish  state  bureaucracy  and  political 
authorities  spread  strong  apathy  towards  the  Kurdish  question  from  every 
possible platform.
The HEP’s often-volatile public meetings and outspoken promotion of Kurdish 
political  and  cultural  rights  created  concern  among  many  bureaucratic  and 
elected officials that the group was a mouthpiece for the PKK, and the party 
faced constant pressure from police, public prosecutors, and many members of 
the Parliament (Watts 1999, 631)     
In the meantime, mass protests that notably erupted in the southeast laid bare 
the grassroots  basis  of  the Kurdish movement,  and began to challenge state 
authority from below. New Year celebrations,  Newroz,  turned into a political 
outcry  for  the  Kurdish  identity.  The events  of  March 1990,  1991 and 1992 
particularly culminated in severe clashes with the security forces. Paul White 
(2000) even draws an analogy with the Palestinian intifada to describe the social 
atmosphere.
To make the symbolism quite apparent, youth began wrapping headscarves over 
their faces after the style of the Palestinian rebel youth. As the temperature of 
the movement rose higher, other features of the Palestinian phenomenon began 
appearing as well, as shops, offices and even some schools were shut down by 
locals in protest at the authorities’ allegedly heavy-handed tactics (White 2000, 
164).
This Kurdish intifada is phrased as serhildan or uprising in the native language. 
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The number of civilians involved in these events was sometimes in the several 
thousands, while the scale of violence came close to warfare. For instance, the 
daily  Milliyet  headline ran “Riot  situation in Nusaybin. 5000 people clashed 
with  soldiers,  1  dead,  6  wounded,  300 detained”  (Milliyet 16.03.1990).  The 
violence ramped up in Cizre a few days later, where four people died and some 
public offices were set alight (Milliyet 21.03.1990). In the following years, PKK 
attacks peaked – towards the mid-1990s – while state-sponsored violence made 
use of  every possible method to suppress Kurdish insurgency. This  included 
counter-guerilla  tactics,  mystery  killings,  torture,  kidnapping  activists, 
imprisoning politicians, setting villages on fire, banning Kurdish publications 
and so  forth.  Still,  (pro-)Kurdish  political  parties  managed to  survive  under 
changing  names,  i.e.  the  Democracy  Party  (DEP 1993-1994),  the  People’s 
Democracy  Party  (HADEP 1994-2003)  which  gave  way  to  the  Democratic 
People’s Party (DEHAP 1997-2005) and then transformed into the Democratic 
Society Party (DTP 2005-2009), and most recently the Peace and Democracy 
Party  (BDP)  of  today17.  As  Watts  rightly  observes,  the  persistent  albeit 
recurrently interrupted political office of these parties “suggested that a Kurdish 
political ‘house’ had been built in the Turkish political system, and that even if 
its inhabitants were arrested, new ones would move in” (Watts 1999, 632). In 
one  sense,  she  argued,  this  ostensibly  conventional  form of  politics-making 
became barely distinguishable from some sort of social movement activity. It is 
“because the relationship between the state and officeholders continues to be a 
publicly  adversarial  one  characterized  by  threats  against  the  status  or  even 
person of the officeholder, who continues publicly to challenge the basic ‘rules 
of the game’” (Watts 2006, 126). The simple fact that as recently as November 
1998 the number of party members arrested exceeded 3000 is perhaps the most 
vivid reminder of this ‘sustained’ conflict with the state (White 2000, 170).
The Kurdish movement’s relationship with the Turkish political regime 
entered a new phase between 1999 and 2005. Two main reasons account for 
this. First, the capture of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 culminated in 
a  relative truce  in  armed insurgency.  Second,  the  heyday of  the EU-Turkey 
rapprochement  in  the first  half  of  the new decade gave  birth  to  a  series  of 
political reforms that relaxed restrictions on the Kurdish identity to some extent. 
Actually,  the indirect  effect  of Europeanization on Kurds was welcomed but 
found insufficient by the (pro-) Kurdish camp. At any rate, the Kurdish question 
had already become transnational  through diaspora relations and the official 
mechanisms of the EU. 
Kurdish activists consider the Turkey-EU accession negotiation period as one 
during which the brokers of Kurdish organizations and parties have the best 
bargaining position to realize change at home.
17For a journalistic narrative of the successive (pro-)Kurdish parties, see “HEP, DEP ve HADEP de kapatılmıştı” 
at http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25029246/, accessed on 16.08.2012.
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Thus, for instance;
[…] Lobby activities are being directed towards members of the EP, members 
of  the  CE,  and  to  a  lesser  extent,  towards  members  of  the  European 
Commission.  Additionally,  the legislative and judiciary bodies in  Turkey are 
indirectly influenced by Turkey’s many convictions on charges of human rights 
violations by the European Court of Human Rights (Casier 2010, 9–10)
From  2006  onwards,  however,  the  situation  took  a  turn  for  the  worse  as 
negotiations stopped progressing and EU membership proved an open-ended 
question. The exogenous political opportunity rooted in accession talks, in other 
words,  lost  momentum for the Kurdish activists.  The domestic  opportunities 
were not any more favorable. In terms of the armed conflict, the PKK resumed 
its  attacks;  at  the  societal  level,  chauvinistic  nationalism spread;  and within 
political  society  the  AKP  consolidated  its  power,  becoming  increasingly 
authoritarian. In the meantime, the Democratic Society Party (DPT) was banned 
by the Constitutional Court in December 200918, and quickly replaced by the 
Peace and Democracy Party (BDP).
Under these circumstances, (pro-)Kurdish politicians and activists felt the 
need to  develop new strategies  to  sustain  the  movement.  At  the  intellectual 
level, the idea of ‘democratic autonomy’ was put forward by the Democratic 
Society  Congress  (DTK),  an  umbrella  platform  hosting  current  and  ex-
politicians and intellectuals in support of the Kurdish cause. This concept relies 
on the local re-interpretations of self-government, autonomy, and to some extent 
federalism which “requires joint elaboration with the establishment of civilian, 
self-organizations  of  society,  is  essentially  the  systematized  model  of  the 
perceptions  of  ‘less  state’,  ‘more  society’,  ‘less  restrictions’,  ‘more 
freedom”(Peace and Democracy Party 2011). 
At the level of protest mobilization, the BDP, like any social movement 
organization (SMO), has sought to expand its collective action repertoire. Two 
methods are worth mentioning here. The first was the decision to boycott the 
constitutional  referendum of September 12 2010. For this purpose,  the party 
organized mass meetings in several provinces including Istanbul (on the Manisa 
and Şanlıurfa meetings see Radikal 05.08.2010). The other, and most recent, are 
the multiple forms of civil disobedience with an ultimate call for “‘education in 
the mother tongue’, amnesty for political prisoners’, suspension of military and 
political  operations’,  and ‘the  lifting  of  the ten  percent  electoral  threshold’” 
(Milliyet 24.03.2011). Mass sit-in were frequently resorted to. One innovation 
was the gathering of people for the Friday prayer outside the mosques. In doing 
this, they rejected the official call for prayer in state-registered mosques, and 
followed imams instructing the namaz on the street instead.          
18See “DTP kapatıldı [DTP is banned]” at http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25030653/, accessed on 16.08.2012.
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The Islamic sphere and civil society: two cases
Islamist groups benefited greatly from the guided growth of associational life 
throughout the 1990s. In fact, it was the junta regime’s idea to promote religion 
as a catalyst for the de-politicization of society. Islamic actors thus enjoyed a 
great deal of leverage in organizing within civil society in comparison to other 
actors such as labor, the left, students, or Kurds. The rise of the Islamist Welfare 
Party in the 1994 local elections in particular also signaled an equivalent pattern 
in political society. Yet as the Islamization of both civil and political society 
became more and more apparent,  the military-bureaucratic establishment felt 
threatened to the extent that the coalition between the Welfare Party and the 
True Path Party was forced to resign shortly after the February 28 1997 National 
Security Council meeting, publicly known as the soft or postmodern coup.  
However,  the  AKP’s  march to  power  in  2002 elicited  more  favorable 
conditions for Islamists to become more vocal in civil  society. The fact that 
religious associations rank first in terms of quantity is arguably emblematic of 
the situation (Figure 2). However, one needs to be more specific alongside this 
in order to shed light on Islamic perspectives on democratization and human 
rights.  Here, I prefer to talk about two associations in the foreground of the 
scene which also mobilize occasionally on the streets.
Figure 2 – Distribution of associations according to their occupation (2012)
Source: Presidency of the Department of Associations, Ministry of Interior
MAZLUM-DER  (Association  for  Human  Rights  and  Solidarity  with  the 
Oppressed  People)  was  established  in  1991.  Originally  a  human  rights 
organization, MAZLUM-DER’s sensitivity to the issue of women’s headscarves 
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plus the predominantly ‘Muslim’ profile of its members created a public image 
as an Islamic NGO. The infamous February 28 1997 decisions addressing the 
Islamic  ‘threat’ Kadıoğlu  (2005)  to  quote  its  president,  led  to  “a  series  of 
stringent measures preventing public visibility of Islamic identities in Turkey”. 
The exclusion of students wearing the headscarf from universities thus became 
part of mundane politics. “MAZLUM-DER stood by these students on the basis 
of human rights violations. This has contributed to its increasing reputation as 
an  Islamic  organization”  (Kadıoğlu  2005,  35).  Despite  its  Islamic  image, 
however, MAZLUM-DER has also been active on several other issues as varied 
as ethnic discrimination, the rights of the non-Muslim minorities, the Kurdish 
issue, state-sponsored violence, and so on. The majority of its activities consist 
in  organizing  seminars,  conferences,  publishing  human  rights  reports  and 
carrying out public opinion surveys; protest is less common but does take place. 
The protest event data collected by the author show that the headscarf issue, the 
Israel-Palestine conflict, and the US involvement in the Middle East were the 
most  frequently raised topics during street  actions organized by MAZLUM-
DER throughout the 2000s.
The  other  organization  I  want  to  mention  briefly  is  ÖZGÜR-DER 
(Association for the Freedom of Thought and Educational Rights), which was 
founded in 1999. The political agenda of ÖZGÜR-DER is evidently narrower 
than MAZLUM-DER. Indeed, its president “stated in the text that signaled the 
foundation  of  the  association  that,  in  response  to  the  extraordinary 
circumstances that paved the way to the curtailment of the educational rights of 
the students who had chosen to wear the headscarf,  ÖZGÜR-DER’s primary 
focus  would  be the  headscarf  issue”  (Kadıoğlu  2005,  32).  According to  the 
association’s own statement, furthermore, human rights advocacy separate from 
the  Islamic  identity  is  mistaken19.  Thus,  compared  to  MAZLUM-DER,  the 
organization  is  less  sympathetic  towards  civil  society  groups  and  social 
movements campaigning against state repression that are not driven by Islamic 
motivations. The militarist-secular tutelage of Turkish politics and its symbols 
in education (ban on the headscarf, monotype religious classes, restrictions on 
the  use  of  Kurdish  in  compulsory  education)  constitute  the  main  axis  of 
ÖZGÜR-DER’s oppositional stance. In terms of activity, ÖZGÜR-DER refuses 
to  be  dominated  by  routinized  professional  work  such  as  regular  press 
declarations  and  reports.  It  remains  to  be  assessed  whether  the  groups  has 
convincingly diversified its action repertoire in line with this claim. Occasional 
appearances at protests against the ban on the headscarf being worn in public 
places, and against Israeli and US policies in the Middle East, are reminiscent of 
MAZLUM-DER’s street actions. 
19See “Özgür-Der Nedir? [What is Özgür-Der?]” at: http://www.ozgurder.org/v2/news_detail.php?id=542, 
accessed on 14.08.2012.
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The Global Justice Movement    
The evolution of the Global Justice Movement (GJM) in Turkey was patterned 
by the emergence of this particular form of contention towards the late 1990s in 
the West. The participation of a handful of leftist activists and unionists in the 
Seattle  events  of  1999,  and  later  in  Genoa,  and  subsequently  the  newly 
emerging social forums contributed to a process of social learning and diffusion 
of  movement  experiences  and  repertoires  of  action  (Baykan  and  Lelandais 
2004;  Gümrükçü  2010).  This  growing  knowledge  and  collaboration  among 
local and transnational activists accumulated in what may be called the native 
manifestations of the GJM in Turkey,  e.g.  the formation of provincial social 
forums,  the  Social  Forum of  Turkey  (2005),  and  a  forerunner  organization 
named  Coalition  for  Peace  and  Global  Justice  (Küresel  Barış  ve  Adalet  
Koalisyonu) (2003) inspired by Tarıq Ali’s famous petition. 
In  Turkey,  the  rise  of  the  GJM  largely  overlapped  with  the  anti-war 
mobilization against the U.S. occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. The protest 
cycle that took place roughly between 2002 and 2005 was no doubt the GJM’s 
most  remarkable  contribution  to  the  enrichment  of  democratic  practices  in 
Turkey. In early 2003, the AKP government drafted a resolution (known as  1 
Mart tezkeresi) licensing the Turkish army to take part in the occupation of Iraq, 
and additionally allow the deployment of U.S. troops within Turkish borders for 
a period of six months. The ongoing protest cycle peaked on March 1 2003 in 
Ankara  when  the  resolution  was  being  voted  in  the  parliament.  Tens  of 
thousands came together on one of the central squares, Sıhhiye, in Ankara in a 
grand  anti-war  coalition  composed  of  numerous  civil  society  organizations 
(reportedly  more  than  100)  (Milliyet 02.03.2003).  5000  policemen  were 
deployed, but no clashes occurred. The resolution was rejected20. Whatever the 
motivations of the MPs, the protest cycle definitely contributed to the outcome 
of the parliamentary vote. After 2005, however, the GJM lost momentum with 
the de-mobilization of anti-war protests.         
Democracy and anti-coup platforms
A peculiar  case  that  has  lain  at  the  crossroads  of  contentious  politics  and 
democracy since the late 1980s merits some attention here. This is the ad hoc 
platforms that  bring  together  many  civil  society  organizations  such as  labor 
unions, vocational associations, human rights groups and other types of NGOs 
with  a  shared  agenda  of  democratization  and/or  a  common  stance  against 
military interventions. Examples of such platforms existed in the 1990s; the so-
called Labor and Democracy Platform was probably the most vocal case (Koç 
2010). In the last ten years, local and provincial variations of these multi-player 
20See “Turkey rejects U.S. troops proposal” at http://articles.cnn.com/2003-03-01/world/sprj.irq.main_1_al-
samoud-demetrius-perricos-prime-minister-abdullah-gul?_s=PM:WORLD, accessed on 14.08.2012.
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yet interim coalitions arose alongside the nationwide platforms. Figures 3 and 4 
illustrate their street mobilizations and specific issues raised as covered by the 
news media. 
Figure 3 – Protest events organized by democracy and anti-coup platforms
Source: protest event data (AA)
Figure 4 – Issues of protest events by democracy and anti-coup platforms
Source: protest event data (AA)
It  seems  that  protest  became  a  more  and  more  common  strategy  for  these 
democracy and anti-coup platforms, as indicated by the upward trend. The range 
of topics addressed during their events is also considerable. However, the fact 
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that these platforms use the label of democracy does not automatically make 
them champions of democracy. A deeper investigation of the groups involved in 
particular platforms would probably uncover that – as in the case of Kemalist-
secularism  –  some  favor  the  political  status  quo  rather  than  democratic 
progression.  Thus,  one  needs  to  be  rather  cautious  regarding  the  implicitly 
undemocratic motivations of pro-democracy mobilizations, and to distinguish 
the different actors.   
A further case: the ARI Movement
This is a pro-democracy initiative that dates back to 1994. A small group of 
well-educated, young Istanbulites started lobbying the existing political parties 
to discuss the ‘need for change’ in the country. At first they developed close ties 
with the center-right ANAP, yet later on in 1998 the group decided to move on 
independently,  i.e.  without  links  to  any  political  party,  and  adhered  to  a 
movement form. Notwithstanding the label of ‘movement’ in its name, the ARI 
operates more like a think-thank that produces projects, publishes reports, and 
conducts public opinion research21. In other words, the political objectives of the 
ARI Movement do not derive from a contentious agenda, nor do they resort to 
protest mobilization strategies. Especially concerned with the encouragement of 
youth to take part in what they describe as “volunteerism”, the promotion of 
“civil  society’s  role  in  the  creation  and  dissemination  of  information”,  and 
“structural and intellectual changes in the social and political arenas”, the ARI 
juxtaposes  the  rule  of  law,  transparency,  ethical  values,  accountability,  and 
participatory democracy as main principles to advocate22. It collaborates with 
likeminded  organizations  such  as  the  Third  Sector  Foundation  of  Turkey 
(TÜSEV) and the Social Democracy Foundation (SODEV), which are just two 
examples of civil society associations that burgeoned after the early 1990s. 
Concluding remarks
This report has shed light on the transition(s) to democracy in Turkey and the 
involvement  of  civil  society  and contentious  actors  in  the  main  episodes  of 
democratization processes. It appears that periods of transition in Turkey were 
overtly elite-driven, leaving little space for contributions from below. Specific 
political contingencies and structural conditions did not favor the latter’s active 
engagement in the transitions. Of course, these situations differed according to 
the contextual characteristics of the day, and this is why particular periods have 
21The institutionalization of the ARI was completed through the establishment of the ARI Social Participation 
and Development Association in 2003 with headquarters in Istanbul, and of the ARI Foundation in 2010 in 
Washington, D.C. 
22See http://www.ari.org.tr/english/index.php?page=mission_vision_and_principles, accessed on 13.08.2012.
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been  covered separately,  if  not  independently.  However,  despite  unfavorable 
political opportunities and high costs stemming from the threat of repression, 
some forms of mobilization, protest, and reaction did exist, at times carried out 
by actors who were not necessarily democratically oriented. The important thing 
is  to  document  such  experiments  as  notable  and  valuable  experiences  for 
subsequent generations of contentious politics.  
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